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United States v. Tucker:
Should Independent Counsels
Investigate and Prosecute
Ordinary Citizens?
BY HANLY A. INGRAM*
INTRODUCTION
he independent counsel statute1 has become an ingrained feature
oftheAmerican political culture.2 Originally passed in response
to Watergate and the Saturday Night Massacre,3 the statute
codified the long-recognized principle that an institutional conflict of
interest exists whenever the Department of Justice ("DOJ") investigates
high-level executive branch officials. The public perception of this conflict
of interest has been damaging to the institution of the presidency and to the
J.D. expected 1999, University of Kentucky.
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99
(1994).
2The Independent Counsel ("IC") statute originally was enacted as the Ethics
in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L.No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824. It has been
reauthorized and re-enacted on three different occasions. See Pub. L. No. 97-409,
96 Stat.2039 (1982);Pub. L.No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987);Pub. L. No. 103-
270, 108 Stat. 731 (1994); see also Kenneth Jost, Independent CounselDisconnect:
Some Critics SuggestLimitingLengths and Targets ofInvestigations, 83 A.B.A. J.
30, 30 (1997) ("'It is now a fixture of American law.... I don't think it's feasible
to repeal it ... ' (quoting former independent counsel Joseph diGenova)).
' For the purposes of this Note, "Watergate" refers to the entire scope of the
break-ins at the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") Headquarters located in
the Watergate complex, the various investigations that followed, and the attempted
cover-up of those break-ins. The Saturday Night Massacre was a specific event
within the drama of Watergate. Generally, "Saturday Night Massacre" refers to the
sequence of events surrounding the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, the
lead attorney investigating Watergate, by President Nixon, who had already been
implicated in the scandal. See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
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nation's confidence in its governmental institutions. To ameliorate this
damage, the independent counsel ("IC") statute provides for the appoint-
ment of supposedly independent attorneys to investigate alleged federal
criminal acts whenever an institutional conflict of interest exists or could
be perceived to exist.4 However, a recent opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Tucker,5 dangerously
extends the reach of an independent counsel's jurisdiction, ultimately
allowing the vast resources of an IC to be used against ordinary citizens.'
This holding not only contravenes the original purpose of the IC statute, but
is potentially patently unfair to the subject of the investigation.
Even at the time of Watergate, the notion of an investigator specifically
appointed for the investigation of high-level executive officials was not a
novel one. At various points in this nation's history, special prosecutors7
have been appointed by various administrations to investigate executive
branch improprieties. However, the public perception of a conflict of
interest within the DOJ became salient after the Saturday Night Massacre.
These historical roots of the IC statute will be discussed in Part I of this
Note. The statute itself covers nine sections of the United States Code and
establishes a specific scheme for the appointment, authority, oversight, and
removal of an IC. Part II will outline this statutory scheme and briefly
discusses its use since 1978. Specific emphasis is placed on "referral
jurisdiction," 8 the issue addressed by the court in Tucker. Part I will
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 591; infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
5United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 76
(1996).
6 See Statutory Interpretation - Ethics in Government Act - Eighth Circuit
Holds Attorney General's Referral of Matters to Independent Counsel to be
Nonreviewable - United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 65 U.S.L. W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 95-2013), 110 HARv. L. REv.
793,794 (1997).
7 The original Ethics in Government Act of 1978, supra note 2, referred to the
investigating attorney as a "special prosecutor." However, public law 97-409
substituted "independent counsel" for "special prosecutor" "in order to reduce the
stigma of, and remove the Watergate connotation from, a special prosecutor
investigation and to more accurately describe the purpose of appointing an
individual to conduct an investigation." S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 19-20 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3555-56. For the purposes of this Note,
"special prosecutor" will refer to a pre-Watergate prosecutor appointed pursuant
to executive branch authority; "IC" will refer to an investigator appointed pursuant
to the IC statute, including one appointed before the 1982 Amendments.
1 28 U.S.C. § 594(e).
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outline the Tucker decision, setting forth the rationale for each of the
Court's holdings. Finally, the Conclusion of this Note will criticize these
holdings, and their potential severity, on legal and policy grounds.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IC STATUTE
The institutional conflict of interest created when the DOJ investigates
high-level executive branch officials was recognized long before Water-
gate.9 "On occasion during the history of our country, a special prosecutor
has been appointed to investigate criminal wrongdoing by high-level
Federal Government officials."' 0 The first occurred in 1875, "when
President Ulysses S. Grant named John B. Henderson as special counsel to
help prosecute the St. Louis Whiskey Ring" in which Grant's personal
secretary and close friend, Orville E. Babcock, was allegedly involved."' 2
Additionally, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Truman, acting through
their Attorneys General, appointed special prosecutors to investigate and
prosecute land fraud rings and Post Office corruption. Perhaps the most
notable pre-Watergate special prosecutor was appointed by President
Coolidge to investigate the infamous Teapot Dome scandal. ' Clearly, four
9 See S. REP. No. 95-170, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216,
4218.
10 S. REP. No. 95-170, at2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216,4218.
Such appointments are made pursuant to DOJ regulatory authority rather than
statutory authority. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
" The St. Louis Whiskey Ring involved a massive fraudulent tax scheme
whereby millions of dollars of tax revenue were withheld from the Treasury
Department through illegal fund-raising among whiskey distillers. See Grolier
Online, The American Presidency: The Whiskey Ring (visited Jan. 10, 1998)
<http://www.grolier.com/presidents/ea/side/whisring.html>.
12 TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL:
EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-1989, at 8 (1989) (citing David A.
Logan, Historical Uses ofa Special Prosecutor: The Administrations ofPresidents
Grant, Coolidge and Truman, 7 The Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service (Nov. 23, 1973)); see also S. REP. No. 95-170, supra note 10, at 2.
13 See EASTLAND, supra note 12; see also Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The Case for the
Independent Counsel, 19 SETONHALLLEGIS. J. 5 n.6 (1994) (discussing the Teapot
Dome scandal and investigation into criminal misconduct within the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the DOJ during the Truman administration).
4 See EASTLAND, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that this appointment "still stands
as the only instance ever of special counsel appointed and confirmed by the
Senate"). "Teapot Dome" refers to an illegal lease of U.S. naval oil reserves by
President Harding's Secretary of the Interior, Albert F. Hall. See JUDY JONES &
1997-98]
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appointments over a period of more than seventy-five years does not
establish a large volume of convention from which the IC statute devel-
oped. However, "[t]he resort to outside counsel in these instances
established a tradition within the traditional politics of ethics of naming
special prosecutors in certain, exceptional circumstances."' 5
The summer of 1997 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
Watergate break-ins. 6 Of course, it was during the second break-in that the
burglars twice put tape around an automatic lock on a door latch, leading
to their discovery by a Watergate security guard. What was first deemed a
"third-rate burglary" by White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, erupted
into the most devastating political scandal in this country's history. Initially
the Watergate investigation was entrusted to the DOJ, but as the cover-up
was revealed and public pressure mounted, Congress increasingly called for
the appointment of a special prosecutor. Such an appointment was in fact
made a condition of the Senate confirmation of Elliot L. Richardson as
Attorney General. 7 After his confirmation, Richardson appointed his
former professor of constitutional law at Harvard, Archibald Cox, as
special prosecutor. This appointment was made with various assurances of
independence, including wide jurisdiction, limited interference by the DOJ,
and a removal power limited only to "extraordinary improprieties.""Is These
limitations, however, were soon ignored by the President.
After Alexander Butterfield, Nixon's former assistant, disclosed the
existence of Nixon's secret taping system in the White House offices, Cox
WILLIAM WILSON, AN INCOMPLETE EDUCATION 49-51 (1987).
'5 EASTLAND, supra note 12, at 8.
'6 There were actually two different break-ins at the DNC headquarters in the
Watergate office complex. The purpose of the first was to install bugging devices.
The second, during which the burglars were arrested, was to relocate the bugging
devices to procure better information. See Samuel Dash, Congress 'Spotlight on the
Oval Office: The Senate Watergate Hearings, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1719, 1720-21
(1994).
Much of this brief Watergate chronology is gleaned from a course entitled
"Governmental Crises and the Legal System" taught in the spring semester of 1996
at Duke University by David M. Dorsen, assistant chief counsel to the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Ervin Committee). This
Note is far too short for any meaningful discussion of Watergate, but countless
volumes have been written on the subject. Those referenced herein are particularly
insightful.
17 See SAM ERvIN, JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 112
(1980).
'1Id. at 116.
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quickly sought the discovery of the tapes that it produced. Nixon defended
on the ground of executive privilege, a defense that ultimately was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon. 9 In the face
of a Supreme Court-endorsed subpoena to comply with the order for
production of the tapes, Nixon, fearing exposure of the cover-up, still
refused to produce the tapes, offering instead edited transcripts. Cox
refused to agree to this compromise, and the stage for the Saturday Night
Massacre was set. Nixon, infuriated by Cox's defiance, ordered his
removal. Attorney General Richardson first refused to fire Cox, then
resigned, as did Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus. 0
Finally, Solicitor General Robert H. Bork obeyed Nixon's order and
removed Cox as Watergate Special Prosecutor." Dubbed the "Saturday
Night Massacre," this sequence of events clearly showed Nixon's
willingness to abuse his political power.
Public reaction to the Saturday Night Massacre was both swift and
remarkable. The American public displayed its penchant for inventive
political participation by driving in front of the White House and honking
in such great numbers that Nixon was forced to retreat to Camp David.22
Additionally, Washington was flooded with "'the heaviest concentrated
volume [of telegrams] on record,' according to Western Union."'23 "In
volume and intensity of denunciation this outcry of the people was without
the faintest precedent in the annals of the country."24 Soon thereafter,
twenty-two Articles of Impeachment were introduced in the House of
Representatives,25 three of which eventually passed.26 Watergate and the
'9 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).2oSee ERVIN, supra note 17, at 239.
2 See id. at 242. This was not the first instance of the removal of a special
prosecutor. President Grant fired special prosecutor Henderson for being "too
aggressive in his pursuit of Babcock." EASTLAND, supra note 12, at 14.
Additionally, President Truman's Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath, fired
special prosecutor Newbold Morris when Morris's inquiry "extended into the
Justice department[.]" Id. at 16 n. 11. Truman then quickly fired McGrath and
"named a new Attorney General, who in turn named a new special prosecutor." Id.
2 See JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE BATTLES OF WATERGATE
PROSECUTORS COX AND JAWORSKI 205 (1977).
23 RICHARD BEN-VENISTE & GEORGE FRAMPTON, JR., STONEWALL, THE REAL
STORY OF THE WATERGATE PROSECUTION 150 (1977) (quoting a Western Union
representative).
24 ERVIN, supra note 17, at 242.
2- See BEN-VENISTE & FRAMPTON, supra note 23, at 150.
2 See ERVIN, supra note 17, at 282.
1997-981
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Saturday Night Massacre, coupled with the perceived governmental
dishonesty during the Vietnam era, devastatingly eroded the public's faith
in government and governmental institutions.27 Various studies show that
the decline of the public's faith in government "became marked during and
following the Watergate crisis."' Congress sought to ameliorate this
damage through various legislative acts, particularly the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978.29
The stated purpose of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was to
"preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of public officials
and of the institutions of the Federal Government."30 A distinct element of
the public sentiment created by Watergate is that the presidency is perhaps
not sufficiently accountable. The Saturday Night Massacre clearly
displayed the institutional conflict of interest that arises when the DOJ
attempts to investigate high-level executive branch officials. This conflict
has been stated in various ways. "[T]he Department of Justice has difficulty
investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed by high-ranking
executive branch officials because the Department as an institution [is]
poorly equipped to handle cases involving senior executive branch
officials."31 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
noted:
Thus, fifty years of the nation's history involving the Teapot Dome,
Truman Administration, and Watergate scandals, has demonstrated a
generally recognized inability of the Department of Justice and the
27 See Robert A. Rankin, Watergate Scandal Still Echoes Through Politics,
Government, Media Today, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 17, 1997, atA10 (" 'The
public cynicism toward political leaders and institutions that we see today very
much has its roots in the dual tragedies of Watergate and the Vietnam era."' Id.
(quoting Mark Rozell, professor of government at American University)).
28 KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PRO-
SECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 44 (1992) (discussing a study by the Center for
Political Studies showing that"[t]he sharpest increase [in percentage of respondents
who felt that government could not be regularly trusted to do what was right] (of
14 percent) occurred between 1972 and 1974, the years that the Watergate scandal
was unfolding").
29 See supra note 2.
30 S. REP. No. 95-170, supra note 9, at 1. Of course, one has to question the
efficacy of this Act, given that confidence in government continues to plummet.
See Confidence in Government Poll, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWs (Denver, Co.), Oct.
13, 1996, at 6A.
31 S. REP. No. 95-170, supra note 9, at 3.
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Attorney General to function impartially with full public confidence in
investigating criminal wrongdoing of high-ranking government officials
of the same political party.... Accordingly, Congress in 1978, acting to
regularize the manner of handling such major conflict of interest
problems, enacted the Special Prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act.
32
This conflict of interest was perhaps most thoughtfully described by
Archibald Cox when discussing one's ability to investigate one's superior.
"'The pressures, the divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as
honorable and conscientious as any individual might be, the public could
never feel entirely easy about the vigor and thoroughness with which the
investigation was pursued. Some outside person is essential."' 33 To resolve
this conflict of interest, Congress created statutory authority for the
appointment of ICs in sensitive cases.
11. THE SCHEME AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IC STATUTE34'
A. The Statutory Scheme
The IC statute creates a two-stage process - review by the Attorney
General to determine if an IC is needed and, if so, the IC's investigation
and prosecution of the matter in question.35 The first step in determining if
the appointment of an IC is warranted is the Attorney General's receipt of
32In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34,42 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
31 S. REP. No. 95-170, supra note 9, at 5 (quoting former special prosecutor
Archibald Cox during consideration of S. 495, 94th Cong., regarding the
"investigation and prosecution of crimes which might involve the Whitehouse."
Id.).
' This Note is far too limited in scope to describe all aspects of the nine code
sections comprising the IC statute. However, several useful summaries exist. See
S. REP. No. 103-101, at 8-9 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748,752-753;
Martin B. Goldberg, Conflicts of Interest and the Independent Counsel Law, 25
Am. ClUM. L. REv. 370,375-80 (1987); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the
Administration of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under
theEthics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-13 (1990); Julie O'Sullivan, The
Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 463,
465-69 (1996); Alexander I. Tachmes, Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978: A Violation of the Separation ofPowers Doctrine or an
Essential Check on Executive Power?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 735, 739-43 (1988).
31 See S. REP. No. 103-10 1, supra note 34, at 9.
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evidence of federal criminal acts. The Attorney General must then assess
that evidence, and may continue to investigate only if she determines
within thirty days36 that the evidence is both specific and credible." If the
Attorney General makes such a determination, she must then "commence
a preliminary investigation with respect to that information."'38
Given specific and credible evidence, a preliminary investigation is
appropriate in two situations. The first is when there are alleged violations
of federal criminal laws by persons with whom the DOJ is deemed to have
an institutional conflict of interest.39 The Senate, in considering the original
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, stated:
Up to this point, this chapter has identified certain positions, the
holders of which have such a relationship to the Attorney General and the
President that there is a conflict of interest or the appearance thereof if the
Department of Justice conducts a criminal investigation of an individual
occupying any of these identified positions.40
Covered persons include the President, Vice-President, certain high-level
executive branch officials, certain DOJ officials, CIA directors, the Internal
Revenue Commissioner, and certain campaign directors of a presidential
campaign.41 The second situation in which the IC statute applies is when
"investigation or prosecution of a person by the Department of Justice may
result in personal, financial, or political conflict of interest[.]"42 This
obviously opens the door to preliminary investigations by the Attorney
General when investigations by the DOJ of the same persons would not
actually present a conflict of interest.43 Through this door, another is
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 591(d)(2) (1996).
" See id. § 591(d)(1)(A), (B).
38 Id.
39 See id. § 591(b). It should be noted that Congress decides with whom the
DOJ has a conflict of interest. See id. § 595(a).
40 S. REP. No. 9.5-170, supra note 9, at 132-33.
41 See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(1)-(7).
42 28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(1). This has been called a catch-all provision. See
generally Dan W. Reicher, Conflict of Interest in Inspector General, Justice
Department, and Special ProsecutorInvestigations ofAgency Heads, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 975 (1983).
43 Indeed, Congress has recognized that "[t]he appearance of conflict is as
dangerous to public confidence in the administration of justice as true conflict
itself." S: REP. No. 95-170, supra note 9, at 6.
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opened for the appointment of an IC when no real conflict of interest exists.
However, it is clear that perceived conflicts (or, more accurately, misper-
ceived conflicts) must be guarded against as well.'
The Attorney General's preliminary investigation must be conducted
according to specific statutory rules.45 The purpose of this investigation is
to determine whether further investigation is warranted. If so, the Attorney
General must apply to a special division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ("Special Division") for the appointment of an
IC." The Special Division is comprised of three judges from the D.C.
Circuit who serve two-year terms 7 The Special Division has the sole
power to appoint an IC pursuant to an Attorney General's request.48
Perhaps the most important provisions of the IC statute for the
purposes of this Note are those covering the prosecutorialjurisdiction of an
IC. Specifically, the Special Division has the sole power to grant the IC her
initial prosecutorialjurisdiction.49 This grant must be such that it "assure[s]
that the independent counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate and
prosecute the subject matter with respect to which the Attorney General has
requested the appointment of the independent counsel, and all matters
related to that subject matter."5 Clearly, this broad statutory grant enables
the Special Division to vest a great deal ofauthority in the IC. Additionally,
if the Attorney General feels that a broader grant ofjurisdiction is required,
she may request the Special Division to expand the original prosecutorial
jurisdiction.51 These provisions combine to allow the IC a great deal of
latitude in her investigation.
" One could argue that the IC statute is itself based upon a misperception. In
other words, despite the Saturday Night Massacre, and despite the institutional
difficulties of DOJ investigations of high-level executive branch crimes, the then-
existing system of accountability worked successfully. Congressional investigation,
non-statutory special prosecutors, media scrutiny, public scrutiny, and threatened
impeachment all acted in concert to bring the facts of Watergate to light. See
O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 476 (arguing that Watergate proved the efficacy of
the above-listed mechanisms).
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 592. The specific conduct in which an Attorney General
should engage during this preliminary investigation exceeds the scope of this Note.
46 See id. § 592(c).
47 See id. § 49.
48 See id. § 592(c).
49 See id. § 593.
501d. § 593(b)(3).
5' See id. § 593(c).
1997-98]
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The type of jurisdiction at issue in United States v. Tucker 52 is
denominated "referral jurisdiction. '5 3 Referral jurisdiction allows an IC to
investigate alleged crimes relating to his original jurisdictional grant.54
Because Tucker turned on this provision, and it therefore is the main focus
of this Note, it is set out in full:
(e) Referral of other matters to an independent counsel. - An
independent counsel may ask the Attorney General or the division of the
court to refer to the independent counsel matters related to the independ-
ent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction, and the Attorney General or the
division of the court, as the case may be, may refer such matters. If the
Attorney General refers a matter to an independent counsel on the
Attorney General's own initiative, the independent counsel may accept
such referral if the matter relates to the independent counsel's prosecuto-
rialjurisdiction. IftheAttorney General refers any matter to the independ-
ent counsel pursuant to the independent counsel's request, or if the
independent counsel accepts a referral made by the Attorney General on
the Attorney General's own initiative, the independent counsel shall so
notify the division of the court.55
As discussed below, this section hardly constitutes a model for statutory
drafting. Consequently, its true meaning has been shaped by judicial
interpretation.56 Clearly, it allows for referral jurisdiction by either the
Special Division or the Attorney General upon request by the IC. Addition-
ally, it empowers an Attorney General to refer a matter to an existing IC
absent any request by the IC. As discussed below in Parts I and IV, courts
have generously read into this provision a great deal of referral power.
B. The Implementation of the IC Statute
Since the enactment of the IC statute, its constitutionality has been
litigated several times, most notably in Morrison v. Olson. 8 Olson arose
52 United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 76
(1996).
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 594(e).
54 See id.
55 Id.
56 See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of this particular provision.
57 The remaining sections of the IC statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 596-599, are largely
immaterial for the purposes of this Note.58Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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out of the investigation by IC Alexia Morrison of alleged false and
misleading testimony given by Theodore B. Olson (formerly Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel) during a House
Judiciary Committee investigation. 9 Olson and two other subjects of the
investigation challenged the IC statute as violating the Appointments
Clause,6° Article I, 6 and the separation-of-powers doctrine.62 Dealing
with each challenge in turn, the United States Supreme Court first held that
because ICs are inferior to the Attorney General, having limited duties and
jurisdiction, they are inferior officers under the Appointments Clause and
thus may be appointed by the judiciary. 3 In rejecting the argument that
"the powers vested in the Special Division by the [IC] Act conflict with
Article I of the Constitution,"' the Court held that the IC's powers do not
constitute "'executive or administrative duties ofa nonjudicial nature [that]
may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the
Constitution.' ,,65 Finally, the Court held that "the Act does not violate the
separation-of-powers principle by impermissibly interfering with the
functions of the Executive Branch. '66 By upholding the constitutionality of
the IC statute, the Olson Court permitted the statute's continued implemen-
tation.
The IC statute is often criticized as being an overused political tool.
67
This argument has some force to it, as revealed by the increasing frequency
with which ICs are appointed. During the statute's first four years, twelve
preliminary investigations were conducted, three ICs were appointed, and
there were no indictments.68 From 1982 to 1987, the next five years of the
"The Judiciary Committee was investigating "efforts of the EPA and the Land
and Natural Resources Division of the Justice Department to enforce the
'Superfund Law.' "Id. at 665.
60 U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2.
61Id. art I.
62 For a discussion of this doctrine, see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677.
63 See id. at 671-77.
64 Id. at 677.
65 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)).
6 Id. at 697.
67 See Thomas S. Martin, Independent Counsel -Checks andBalances, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 536 (1990) (advocating various reforms of the IC statute limiting
the IC's powers and availability, including reducing the number of officials
covered by the act); O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 463 (discussing overuse); Jost,
supra note 2 (discussing limiting the number of officials covered by the IC sta-
tute).
6 See S. REP. No. 103-101, supra note 34, at 13.
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statute's operation, eleven preliminary investigations were conducted,
resulting in the appointment of seven ICs.69 These appointments were more
productive, resulting in several indictments and convictions, most notably
those involving the Iran-Contra scandal. ° The period 1987-1992 produced
fourteen preliminary investigations resulting in the appointment of three
ICs, whose investigations ended in varying success, including some
indictments and convictions.7' Of course, the success of an independent
counsel investigation is not measured solely by its outcomes; it is often
more important merely to bring the facts to light.
Each reauthorization of the statute72 extends the life of the statute for
only five years. In 1992, the statute was allowed to expire without
reauthorization largely "due to opposition by Republican critics of Judge
Lawrence Walsh's Iran-Contra investigation." 73 The expiration of the
statute, however, did not close three pending IC investigations.74 While the
statute was not in effect, Attorney General Janet Reno was faced with
widespread political pressure to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
Whitewater and the death of former White House Counsel Vincent Foster.7'
"Attorney General Reno, who is a supporter of the IC statute and wanted
to await its reauthorization, finally acceded to Republican demands and
appointed an IC [Robert B. Fiske, Jr.] pursuant to DOJ regulations."'76
69 See id.
70 See id. Generally, "Iran-Contra" refers to the sequence of events surrounding
the "U.S. Government involvement with the Nicaraguan contras during a
prohibition on military aid from October 1984 to October 1986." LAwRENCE E.
WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA
MATTERS: INVESTIGATIONS ANDPROSECUTIONS 1 (1993). Essentially this involved
a diversion of funds collected from the sales of arms to Iran to support the contras
in Nicaragua. See id.
71 See S. REP. NO. 103-101, supra note 34, at 14.
' See supra note 2 for a general discussion of reauthorizations of the Ethics in
Government Act.
' O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 471. Republican critics accused Judge Walsh
of pursuing a personal vendetta against party members allegedly involved in the
Iran-Contra scandal. See Jerry Seper, Prosecutors 'Politics Show in Party Favors,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at A3.
74 See S. REP. NO. 103-101, supra note 34, at 8.
' See O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 471; see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITU-
TIONALCONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS ANDTHEPRESIDENT 74-75 (4th ed. 1997).
76 O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 471 n.40 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (1995)
("regulatory authority for appointment of independent counsel")). This is the same
type of authority pursuant to which special prosecutors were appointed before the
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"On June 30, 1994, the IC statute, which had by now, not surprisingly,
gained Republican converts, was reauthorized."" Shortly thereafter, in
order to avoid any perceived impartiality caused by Fiske's continued
investigation despite authority originally emanating from the DOJ, the
Special Division appointed a new IC, Kenneth Star.78 Since the statute's
reauthorization, four ICs have been appointed by the Special Division,"
including Kenneth Starr. Furthermore, ever-increasing calls from congres-
sional leaders for the appointment of ICs demonstrate that not only have
ICs become extensively used, they have become political ammunition. For
instance, many politicians have recently demanded the appointment of an
IC to investigate alleged fund-raising abuses by the Clinton campaign in
the 1996 Presidential election. 0 Given the frequency of IC appointments,
many critics argue that the statute is an overused political tool.81
Ea. THE TUTCKER DECISION
Tucker arose out ofthe Whitewaterinvestigation by IC Kenneth Starr.
82
The initial investigation (by Robert Fiske pursuant to regulatory authority)
was deemed to warrant an independent counsel to determine:
"whether any individuals or entities have committed a violation of any
federal criminal law, other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or infraction,
relating in any way to James B. McDougal's, President William
Jefferson Clinton's, or Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton's relationships with
IC statute was enacted.
7 Id. at 472.
79 See United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 76 (1996); see also discussion infra Part IV.
71 See Toni Locy, Keeping Tabs on Independent Counsels; Probes of Clinton,
Aides Have Cost $36 Million, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1997, at A19.
80 See Lee Davidson, Hatch Makes Case for Independent Probe, DESERET
NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Apr. 30, 1997, at AO1; see also Mary Ann Akers,
Reno Decision Nets Summons to Hill by GOP: Ruling Called Protection ofClinton,
THE WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, atA8; Neil A. Lewis, Republicans React Quickly
andAngrily to Reno Move, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at Al.
8' See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
82 Due to ever-increasing media frenzy and scrutiny of IC investigations,
Whitewater has been widely chronicled. The extensive and as-yet undetermined
facts of Whitewater are not critical to this Note, as it is mainly concerned with the
potential future impact of Tucker, rather than the impact of Tucker on the
defendants involved in Whitewater.
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Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, Whitewater Develop-
ment Corporation, or Capital Management Services, Inc."
83
During the course of his investigation, Starr came across evidence of
violations of federal criminal law by former "Governor of Arkansas Jim
Guy Tucker, his Little Rock lawyer John H. Haley, and his San Francisco
business partner William J. Marks, Sr., 84 who comprised the defendants
named in Tucker.
Pursuant to the IC statute," Starr sought referral jurisdiction from
Attorney General Reno, which was granted on the basis that "this matter
... [is] related to the OIC's investigation. '86 Additionally, Starr sought
referral jurisdiction from the Special Division, which was granted by an
order of referral that "precisely track[ed] the Attorney General's September
2, 1994, referral to the OIC of all investigative and prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion over federal criminal matters relating to the [Landowner's Manage-
ment System] bankruptcy."8 After an investigation pursuant to this
authority, the Tucker defendants were indicted by a federal grand jury for
the Eastern District of Arkansas for "tax fraud; bankruptcy fraud; making
false material statements for the purpose of influencing [Capital Manage-
ment Services], a federally licensed management company in Arkansas;
and conspiracy to commit various of these acts."88
Defendant Tucker "moved to dismiss the indictment.., on the ground
that the Independent Counsel exceeded his jurisdiction."89 Starr countered
by arguing "(1) that the indictment of the defendants in this case [fell]
within the scope of his prosecutorial jurisdiction; and (2) that even if it
[did] not, the referral of the matter to him, as independent counsel, is not
subject to judicial review."9 The district court, Judge Henry Woods
presiding, agreed with Tucker and quashed the indictments. By holding that
83 Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1315 (quoting In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
Div. No. 94-1, Order at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Sp. Div. Aug. 5, 1994)).
84Id. at 1316.
81 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
594(e)).
86 Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1315-16 (discussing responsive letter from the Acting
Assistant Attorney General dated Sept. 2, 1994).
87 Id. at 1316.
88.1d.
89 United States v. Tucker, 898 F. Supp. 654, 655 (E.D. Ark. 1995), rev'd, 78
F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 76 (1996).
90 Id.
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the IC lacked prosecutorial jurisdiction,91 Judge Woods recognized a right
to judicial review of a referral jurisdiction grant.
Judge Woods was shocked at the idea that a person could be subject to
such an investigation without redress in the courts to determine if it was
jurisdictionally permitted. He said, "I cannot accept the proposition that a
citizen can be put on trial in my court for a loss of his liberty and that no
court has the power to determine whether there is jurisdiction to proceed
in the matter."92 Additionally, Judge Woods relied on some language from
Morrison v. Olson to hold "that the matters contained in Count I of the
indictment, which the Attorney General has referred to the Independent
Counsel, are completely unrelated to the Clintons and McDougal."93 Thus,
the indictments fell outside of IC Starr'sjurisdiction and were dismissed.94
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that a grant of referral jurisdiction is nonreviewable.95
The court went on to say that even if it were reviewable, there was no abuse
of discretion by the Attorney General because "the subject matter of the
referral jurisdiction in this case [was] 'related' to the Independent
Counsel's original prosecutorialjurisdiction .... 96 In holding the referral
issue to be nonreviewable, the court analogized to normal prosecutorial
discretion, stating that "prosecutorial decisions of the nature here in
question - who should be prosecuted and for what alleged crimes - have
long been committed to the discretion of the prosecutor." 97 Additionally,
the court reviewed the legislative history of the 1987 amendments98 and
determined that "the Attorney General's decisions under the independent
counsel law are nonjusticiable."9 9 Thus, two different rationales were
offered for holding referral decisions to be nonreviewable.
Alternatively, the court held that even if review of such decisions is
allowed, the "relatedness" requirement of § 594(e) was satisfied."® Noting
that referral jurisdiction may not have even been necessary given the broad
9' See id. at 663.
92Id. at 658.
93Id.
94Id. at 663.
9' See Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1316.
96 Id. at 1322.
97 Id. at 1317.
" See supra note 2.
99 Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1318.
'a' See id. at 1322.
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original jurisdictional grant by the Special Division, ' the court gave a
liberal reading to the "relatedness" requirement of § 594(e). Rejecting an
argument based on language in Morrison v. Olson, the court held that all
that is required for an Attorney General's referral decision under the
"relatedness" requirement is a "procedural and factual link between the
OIC's original prosecutorial jurisdiction and the matter sought to be
referred."'0 2 Applying this rule to the facts, the court held that witness
overlap, defendant overlap, and factual relatedness between McDougal and
Tucker and between Capital Management Services and Madison Guaranty
easily satisfied the "relatedness" requirement.0 3
Similarly, the court rejected Tucker's contention that he and the other
defendants did not fall "within the meaning of § 591 who can be investi-
gated by the OIC, and therefore they cannot be prosecuted by the OIC for
wrongdoing."' 1° This argument was rejected on the basis that referral
jurisdiction need not relate to a covered person and because the original
grant of jurisdiction was made pursuant to the catch-all provision of §
591(c).'0° Finally, the court rejected the argument that the referral
jurisdiction granted to Starr was more accurately described as "expanded
jurisdiction,"'" and was therefore unavailable to Starr because he did not
apply for such jurisdiction.0 7 The court reasoned that this argument was
rendered moot due to the "decision that referral was proper because the
referred matter is related to the Independent Counsel's prosecutorial
jurisdiction." 0 8 Thus, Tucker allows a great deal of discretion to be
exercised by both the Attorney General and an IC when dealing with
matters of referral jurisdiction.
1°Along with the jurisdictional language that Tucker quoted, see supra text
accompanying note 83, the original jurisdictional grant contained the following
language: "'jurisdiction and authority to seek indictments and to prosecute any
persons or entities involved in any of the matter described above, who are
reasonably believed to have committed a violation of any federal criminal law
arising out of such matters."' Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1315 (quoting In re Madison
Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1, Order at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Sp. Div. Aug. 5,
1994)).
1' Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1321.
103 See id.
104Id. at 1321-22.
05 See id. at 1322; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
'6 See Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1322.
107 See id. Section 593(c) allows the Special Division to expand the IC's
jurisdiction if the IC receives information about criminal violations by persons
under § 591 who are not otherwise covered by the original jurisdictional grant.
108 Id.
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IV. ASSESSING THE TUCKER DECISION
Tucker's broad grant of investigatory power, in light of the well-
documented purposes and implementation of the IC statute, is potentially
patently unfair to ordinary citizens who might be subjected to independent
counsel review under a grant of referral jurisdiction. "The Tucker decision
is unprecedented because it permits an IC to prosecute ordinary citizens for
crimes that are not factually related to the reason for the ICs appointment
- that is, to the alleged illegal activity of a high-ranking executive branch
official."'" For several legal and policy reasons, Tucker was a poorly
reasoned opinion with potentially disastrous implications. The prosecuto-
rial discretion analogy employed by the court simply missed the issue at
hand. Furthermore, the reliance on legislative history, although persuasive,
was not entirely dispositive because the legislature did not explicitly state
the principles on which the court relied for its holding. The real danger of
Tucker is that it will open the floodgates for frequent IC investigation and
prosecution of ordinary citizens. This was not intended by the IC statute
and would impose severely unreasonable burdens on such investigatory
targets without evenpermittingthose individuals to object on jurisdictional
grounds. Clearly, such a result is patently unfair to those against whom
Tucker may be used.
A. Reviewability
1. The Prosecutorial Discretion Analogy'
10
The analogy drawn by the court to a normal prosecutor's exercise of his
discretion to determine whether to prosecute misses the point of Tucker's
motion to dismiss the indictment against him and the point of the IC
statute. Rather than the traditionally discretionary issue of who is to be
prosecuted, the main issue under the IC statute is who is to prosecute? In
other words, the court mischaracterized the issue before it. Noting that
prosecutorial decisions "of the nature here in question - who should be
prosecuted and for what alleged crimes "' fall within the realm of
prosecutorial discretion,"' the court stated, "'In our criminal justice
system, the Government retains "broad discretion" as to whom to
prosecute .... This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the
109 See Statutory Interpretation, supra note 6, at 796.
"0 See Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1316-17.
Id. at 1317.
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decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.""'"
Admittedly, the issue of who to prosecute should be nonreviewable, but
that is not the issue that was before the court.
In fact, the court hinted at this issue-dodging, stating, "Although
prosecutorial discretion is not the precise issue here, we do not see any
reason to believe that the Attorney General's referral decision is any more
subject to judicial review than the usual prosecutorial decisions.""'
Truthfully, there are many reasons to distinguish between referral decisions
and ordinary prosecutorial decisions. The first, and most obvious, is that an
IC is not a typical prosecutor. An IC is a specially created officer for a
special situation. The court admitted as much by stating, "An independent
counsel, of course, is not an ordinary United States attorney."' 14 Given the
complex statutory scheme governing when and how ICs should be
appointed and removed, delineating the manner of their investigations, and
providing fortheir authority and oversight, it cannot be argued otherwise.1
Even recognizing these distinctions, however, the court insisted on making
its erroneous analogy.
The analogy simply addresses the wrong question. The IC statute was
designed to remove from the DOJ those investigations in which an actual
or perceived conflict of interest exists." 6 Broadly speaking, this requires
determining who is fit to investigate and prosecute high-level executive
branch officials. The critical issue under the statute, who is to prosecute,
was simply ignored by the court. Instead the court assumed that the IC was
the proper attorney for the job and characterized the issue as one of usual
prosecutorial decision-making, entirely ignoring the jurisdictional issue.
Regardless of the facts in Tucker, ordinary citizens are better protected by
investigations andprosecutions conductedbythe careerprofessionals at the
DOJ.1
7
The better analogy to draw is that of the power of a grand jury to
investigate and indict. In many states, a grand jury's jurisdiction and
authority "is limited by the jurisdiction of the court of which it is an
"' Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
113 1d.
" 4 Id. at 1316.
115 Several differences between ICs and regular prosecutors are discussed
below. See supra Part IY.B.
1 6 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
117 See supra Part IV.B.
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appendage.""' Thus, a grand jury's investigation' 9 or indictment 12 is
reviewable on the ground that it was acting outside of its jurisdiction. For
instance, in State ex rel. Atkins v. Juvenile Court ofMarion County,12 1 an
indictment was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the court holding that
"[t]he grandjury's power to indict is limited to the jurisdiction of the court
of which it is an extension,. so the grand jury was without jurisdiction to
return the indictment in this case."'" Furthermore, it has been recog-
nized that such an objection may be raised at any time during the proceed-
ings.12
Clearly, then, whether a grand jury has sufficient jurisdiction to
investigate or indict is reviewable and can warrant a dismissal if such
jurisdiction is lacking.2 This is exactly the issue presented in Tucker.
whether the investigating body has jurisdiction enabling it to investigate.
Thus, just as a grand jury's determination of whether to investigate or
indict is reviewable on jurisdictional grounds, an Attorney General's
referral decision should be policed in this manner. Depriving a defendant
of this right to review could subject her to a loss of her liberty without any
court even passing upon the question of whether the entity that took that
liberty was empowered to do so. By potentially subjecting an ordinary
person to IC investigation or prosecution without even the fundamental
right of jurisdictional review, Tucker places the subject of such an
investigation in an utterly powerless position.
"' Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,55 (1906) (citing United States v. Hill, 1 Brock.
156 (1809)); see also Matter of Arawak Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd., 489 F. Supp.
162, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); In re May 1972 San Antonio Grand Jury, 366 F. Supp.
522,530 (W.D. Tex. 1973); State v. Funderburk, 191 S.E.2d 520,522 (S.C. 1972);
38 AM. JUR. 2D Grand Jury § 28 (1968); 38A C.J.S. Grand Juries § 80 (1996).
... See Cook v. Smith, 834 P.2d 418, 422 (N.M. 1992) (stating that "[c]learly
a grand jury cannot be convened to ... investigate criminal conduct alleged to have
occurred in another jurisdiction.").
2' See State ex rel. Atkins v. Juvenile Court of Marion County, 247 N.E.2d 53,
54 (Ind. 1969) (dismissing an indictment for lack of jurisdiction); People v.
O'Neill, 53 N.Y.S.2d 945 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945) (dismissing indictments for lack of
jurisdiction); People ex rel. Morrison v. Pollack, 34 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. App. Div.
1942) (dismissing an indictment for lack ofjurisdiction); State v. Bond, 204 S.E.2d
713 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (dismissing an indictment for lack of jurisdiction).
121 State ex rel. Atkins v. Juvenile Court of Marion County, 247 N.E.2d 53 (Ind.
1969).
12Id. at 54.
See O'Neill, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
124See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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2. Legislative History Rationale"
The legislative history that the Tucker court relied upon regarding the
reviewability of Attorney General decisions under the statute is much more
persuasive than the prosecutorial discretion analogy drawn by the court in
Tucker. However, even this rationale is not completely dispositive or
convincing, because it is doubtful that Congress considered that referral
jurisdiction would be invoked against ordinary citizens. The Tucker court
examined the legislative history surrounding the 1987 reauthorization of
the statute,126 particularly those provisions pertaining to the review of
Attorney General decisions made under the statute.127 First, the court noted
that the conferees explicitly endorsed, but did not codify, two holdings that
precluded judicial review of an Attorney General's decision not to conduct
a preliminary investigation.128 The court noted:
Thejoint statement explained, however, that such a [senate] provision was
not included in the jointly proposed legislation "because the conferees did
not wish to suggest, by indicating a lack of judicial review of Attorney
General decisions on preliminary investigations, that judicial review
might be available of other Attorney General decisions under this
chapter." . . . "[T]he conferees agree that an Attorney General's
determinations under the independent counsel law are not subject to
judicial review."
129
Indeed this paragraph, when read in isolation, seems to preclude
judicial review of an Attorney General's decision to grant referral
jurisdiction. However, the next sentence in the House report is very
revealing, showing exactly what type of decisions the conferees had in
mind. "[Nonreviewable Attorney General decisions] include[ ] such
determinations as whether to investigate a person under 591(c), whether to
" See United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1317-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 76 (1996).
126 See supra note 2.
127 See Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1317-18.
"8 See id. at 1317. The two holdings referred to were Dellums v. Smith, 797
F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986), and Banzhafv. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
For further discussion of these cases, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-452, at 22
(1987), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2188.
129 Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1317-18 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-452, supra
note 128).
[VOL. 86
UNITED STATES . TucKER
exercise recusal from a case, and whether to request appointment of an
independent counsel." ' Vesting an independent counsel with jurisdiction
is a far different matter than the examples set forth by the conferees. It is
important to bear in mind that only the Special Division can vest an IC with
original jurisdiction.' 31 The difference between granting original jurisdic-
tion and referral jurisdiction is immaterial where the referral jurisdiction
designates an entirely new party subject to investigation.
A close reading of the statute indicates that investigating an entirely
new party is more suitably a matter of "expansion jurisdiction. 13 The
expansion jurisdiction section provides that "[i]f the independent counsel
discovers or receives information about possible violations of criminal law
by persons as provided in section 591, which are not covered by the
prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel, the independent
counsel may submit such information to the Attorney General.'1 3 This
triggers a preliminary investigation, which can result in the expansion of
jurisdiction by the Special Division, as the Attorney General does not have
similar power to do so even if he decides an expansion is warranted.
34
Jurisdiction may also be expanded if the Attorney General fails to notify
the Special Division within thirty days that more time for investigation is
needed. 135 This provision precisely covers the situation in which evidence
is discovered showing possible federal criminal acts by a person outside the
grant of original jurisdiction, which presumably would be the case if an
ordinary citizen were implicated by the evidence. 3 6 In contrast to the
expansion jurisdiction section, which specifically mentions persons not
covered by the original jurisdiction, the referral jurisdiction provision only
covers referral of "matters. ' 137 By vesting the power to expand jurisdiction
exclusively in the Special Division, Congress clearly intended that a
jurisdictional decision that significantly enlarges the scope of an IC
130 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-452, supra note 128, at 22.
131 See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3) (1994); supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c); supra note 51 and accompanying text. Of course,
this argument was specifically rejected under the facts of Tucker. See Tucker, 78
F.3d at 1322.
133 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2).
134 See id. § 593(c)(2)(C).
135 See id.
136 Of course, this argument turns on the breadth of the original jurisdiction.
Thus, in cases like Tucker, with a very wide grant of original jurisdiction, even
persons who are not specifically the subject of that original jurisdiction may
nevertheless be covered by that jurisdiction for purposes of § 593(c)(2)(C)(ii).
137 Id. § 594(e).
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investigation is to be subject to judicial scrutiny. This rationale strongly
supports allowing judicial review of a referral jurisdiction decision.
Finally, the Tucker court stated that "[t]he absence of judicial review
of the discretionary referral decision merely allows the prosecution to
proceed without the delay that judicial review inevitably would entail; it
does not direct the outcome of the prosecution."'13 This is perhaps the most
limited interpretation of the IC's jurisdiction in the entire decision. First,
it ignores the practical impact of IC investigations, which often are
devastating to the subject of the investigation.3 1 Second, avoiding delay is
hardly a sufficient rationale for potentially subjecting a defendant to a loss
of liberty without a court passing upon whether the IC even has the
authority to conduct an investigation. Finally, this statement simply ignores
the importance of reviewing jurisdiction in our justice system. As Judge
Woods stated in the district court opinion in Tucker: 40
Surely the Independent Counsel and Attorney General do not suggest that
there can be no judicial review of prosecutorial jurisdiction of an
independent counsel. If this were so, the Special Division would be
virtually the only court in American jurisprudence, save the Supreme
Court of the United States, whose decisions are subject to no judicial
review whatsoever, regardless of whether those decisions are patently
contrary to law. Such a precedent would be both novel and dangerous.1
41
However, despite these severe dangers, the court in Tucker chose the novel
course of depriving any defendant subject to IC referral jurisdiction of the
fundamental right to review.
B. Relatedness
The Eighth Circuit's overly generous reading of the relatedness
requirement of referral jurisdiction in Tucker ignored both legal precedent
and policy considerations. The relatedness requirement was specifically
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson,42
"' United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 76 (1996).
139 See infra Part IV.B.
"' United States v. Tucker, 898 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Ark. 1995), rev'd, 78 F.3d
1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 76 (1996).
141 Id. at 659.
142 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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wherein the Court addressed the meaning of relatedness for the purposes
of establishing the original jurisdiction of an IC.' 43 Although this portion
of thd opinion is not a model of clarity, some reference is made to
relatedness for referral jurisdiction purposes. The Tucker court ignored the
restrictive view of relatedness set forth by the Supreme Court in Morrison
v. Olson. Additionally, the Tucker court ignored the practical characteris-
tics of ICs and their investigations that set them apart from normal criminal
prosecutions. Specifically, the loose relatedness interpretation by the
Tucker court ignores the original purpose of the IC statute and the factors
associated with IC investigations that essentially make them unfair when
applied to ordinary citizens. These factors include extremely costly
investigations and prosecutions, a lack of accountability, and the devastat-
ing impact an IC investigation can have even in the absence of an
indictment.'
44
1. The Morrison v. Olson Relatedness Formulation
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court settled questions pertaining
to the IC statute's constitutionality. 4 5 One of the issues resolved in this
case was whether "the powers vested in the Special Division by the Act
conflict with Article II" of the Constitution."'47 In holding that there is no
conflict, the Court first discussed the power of the Special Division to
appoint an IC and define her jurisdiction.'48 Recognizing that Congress
"may vest the power to define the scope of the office in the court as an
incident to the appointment of the officer pursuant to the Appointments
Clause," 49 the Court nonetheless imposed a fairly restrictive limit on the
Special Division's determination of jurisdiction:
In order for the Division's definition of the counsel's jurisdiction to be
truly "incidental" to its power to appoint, the jurisdiction that the court
141 See id. at 677-81.
144 See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of cost
considerations, infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of an
IC's lack of accountability, and infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the impact of an IC investigation.
141 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677-81.
146 U.S. CONST. art. III.
141 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677.
148 See id.
149 Id. at 679.
1997-98)
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
decides upon must be demonstrably related to the factual circumstances
that gave rise to the Attorney General's investigation and request for the
appointment of the independent counsel in the particular case.
150
In a footnote to this sentence, the Court imposed the same limitation on the
Special Division's power "to expand the jurisdiction of the counsel upon
request of the Attorney General under § 593(c)(2)."''I ClearlytheMorrison
Court recognized the importance of limiting the jurisdiction of an IC to the
facts that originally gave rise to her appointment.
The Court then listed the other duties of the Special Division,
including the power to grant referral jurisdiction.'52 In commenting on the
referral jurisdiction section in a footnote, the Court stated:
In our view, this provision does not empower the court to expand the
original scope of the counsel's jurisdiction; that may be done only upon
request of the Attorney General pursuant to § 593(c)(2). At most, § 594(e)
authorizes the court simply to refer matters that are "relate[d] to the
independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction" as already defined.
15 3
The defendants in Tucker argued that this language shows an intent by the
Supreme Court that any grant of referral jurisdiction must be demonstrably
related to the original grant of prosecutorial jurisdiction.'54 This argument
is very persuasive. It is clear from the excerpted footnote that the Supreme
Court was addressing the furthest limit of the Special Division's power to
grant referral jurisdiction. The introductory language "[a]t most"'15 clearly
evinces that the Court was discussing a limitation. Then the quoted material
distinguishes between expansions of jurisdiction and referrals ofjurisdic-
tion. Given the above distinction that expanded jurisdiction specifically
relates to "persons," while referral jurisdiction is only concerned with
"matters," it is arguable that the Court intended to restrict the authorization
of an investigation of an entirely new person.
156
150 Id.
'5' Id. at 679 n.17.
152 See id. at 680.
153 Id. at 680 n.18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (1994)).
154 See United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 76 (1997).
155 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680 n.18.
156 See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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Of course, this argument was rejected by the Eighth Circuit in Tucker,
which held that relatedness for an Attorney General's referral decision1
57
depends merely on "the procedural and factual link between the OIC's
original prosecutorial jurisdiction and the matter sought to be referred."'
' 8
The court stated that if the demonstrably related requirement were imposed,
"referral would never be necessary and section 594(e) would be superflu-
ous."' 59 Arguably, a less restrictive requirement of relatedness renders
referral jurisdiction even more superfluous, because that requirement will
nearly always be satisfied.
Legislative history as to the meaning of "relatedness" within § 594(e)
is scarce. Originally, the stated purpose of § 594(e) was to recognize that
"once a specialprosecutor is appointed and actively involved in conducting
a criminal investigation, the case he is pursuing may develop information
with regard to related criminal matters."'' Clearly this is not very helpful
in determining the exact definition of "relatedness" for referral jurisdiction
purposes. Given the restrictive view of jurisdictional grants by the
Morrison v. Olson Court, however, a mere procedural and factual link is
clearly too loose of a connection.161 Additionally, the practical consider-
ations listed below compel a much more restrictive interpretation of
relatedness.
2. The Original Purpose of the IC Statute
As discussed above, the original purpose of the IC statute had nothing
to do with investigating ordinary citizens. Yet, the expansive "relatedness"
definition by the court in Tucker allows exactly that. Various practical
considerations combine to show the devastating effect an IC investigation
or prosecution could have on an ordinary citizen. Most importantly,
however, the investigation by an IC of an ordinary citizen simply is not
what was originally intended by Congress. As stated above, 62 the purpose
"' This holding, when combined with Morrison v. Olson, sets up two different
formulations of relatedness for referral jurisdiction purposes. The first, which
requires demonstrable relatedness, only applies to situations in which the Special
Division is granting referral jurisdiction. Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1321. "This contrasts
with the Attorney General's broader referral power, which is not constrained by
separation-of-powers concerns." In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
151 Tucker, 78 F.3d. at 1321.
159 Id.
160 S. REP. No. 95-170, supra note 9, at 69.
161 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679.
1
62 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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of the Ethics in Government Act and its special prosecutor provisions was
to restore public faith in the federal government. It can scarcely be argued
that an IC's investigation of an ordinary citizen is so weighty a matter of
public concern that it implicates our faith in governmental institutions.
This fundamental flaw in Tucker is readily apparent when considering
the specific purpose of the creation of the IC statute. As noted above, 63 the
statute was meant to cure any conflict of interest created when the DOJ
investigates high-level executive branch officials. "Congress, of course,
was concerned when it created the office of independent counsel with the
conflicts of interest that could arise in situations when the Executive
Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers."'" Such
a conflict simply does not exist when an IC investigates an ordinary citizen,
unless that citizen is so inextricably linked with a covered individual that
the catch-all provision, § 591, applies. However, such situations are few
and far between.
In fact, the statute has been incessantly criticized on the ground that it
covers too many individuals.16 According to one-time independent counsel
Joseph diGenova (who investigated Clinton's passport file in 1992),
"[t]here is no reason to cover anybody outside the Justice Department."'"
Although the list of covered persons has never been shortened, 67 such
criticism continues. Similarly, attempts to extend coverage to members of
Congress have failed because "no inherent conflict exists in its prosecuting
Members of Congress.' 168 Clearly, investigating alleged crimes by
members of Congress implicates public faith in governmental institutions.
If such investigations are not serious enough to warrant an IC investigation,
then ordinary citizens, who likewise create no DOJ conflict of interest,
should not be subject to an IC investigation.
An IC is a specifically created officer to cure a specific problem. If that
problem does not exist, an IC should not be appointed. Nevertheless, this
is exactly what occurs when an IC encounters evidence of alleged federal
crimes by ordinary citizens outside the range of his prosecutorialjurisdic-
tion. Even if those ordinary citizens are public figures, investigating them
is better left to the career professionals at the DOJ. In fact, the Public
63 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
'6 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677.165 See O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 475-80; Jost, supra note 2, at 30.
166 Jost, supra note 2, at 30.
'67 Amendments aimed at reducing the number of covered officials have been
proposed, but none have been adopted. See S. REP. No. 103-101, supra note 34, at
19.
168Id. at 18.
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Integrity Section of the DOJ was specifically created to handle investiga-
tions of a sensitive public nature. 169 ICs often load their offices with DOJ
personnel because "'Justice detailees provide a ready source of the cost-
effective, up-to-date and experienced personnel that independent counsels
need for a quick and solid performance."' 170 This fact underscores the
notion that "Congress would essentially like-but does not require-that IC
investigations proceed as a DOJ investigation .... ,17 Thus, when an
investigation can proceed in the DOJ, given a minimal factual connection
and minimal public perception of a conflict of interest, it should. However,
Tucker dangerously allows such investigations to fall within an IC's
jurisdiction, without any judicial review.
3. Cost Considerations
Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of an IC investigation is
its often enormous expense. For instance, the length and breadth of the
Whitewater investigation, including the Tucker prosecutions, have made it
extremely expensive." This is not a new phenomenon. Historically, IC
investigations have come at a high premium. While some IC investigations
have been cut short without an indictment, resulting in low total costs, 73
most investigations end up costing taxpayers millions of dollars. 74 Before
Whitewater, the most expensive IC investigation was Iran-Contra, which
cost taxpayers $40 million over a seven-year period. 7 While no one can
reasonably doubt the seriousness of Iran-Contra, the $40-million-dollar
price tag does indicate that ICs may abuse their available resources.
169 See EASTLAND, supra note 12, at 147 n.8.
170 O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 469 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-101, supra note
34, at 25-26).
71 Id. at 470.
"T See Whitewater Probe Surpasses $30-Million, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Oct. 6, 1997, at A2 (citing a General Accounting Office report that the
Whitewater investigation cost over $30 million); Starr Runs Up $30 Million Tab
in Clinton Probe, THE BUFFALO NEws, Oct. 1, 1997, at 6A (citing the same
General Accounting Office report).
'73 See S. REP. No. 103-101, supra note 34, at 13-14 (indicating that some
investigations have actually been very low-cost, in the range of $3330 to $17,000).
'74 See id.
"7 s See O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 502 (stating that the real cost of the $40
million for the investigation, including IC probe and "the cost to various
government agencies of complying with document requests and subpoenas," was
$100 million).
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Additionally, the resources available to an IC are virtually limitless.
In the conduct of the investigation, the IC holds a blank check....
An IC is the only prosecutor in the country who is by statute entitled to
call upon all the vast resources of the federal government without
providing any justification, without assuming responsibility for funding
shortfalls, and without worrying about competing demands upon available
resources. 176
In the face of such enormous resources, the costs associatedwith defending
a client who is the subject of an IC investigation have skyrocketed.1" The
IC investigation of Theodore B. Olson (which spawnedMorrison v. Olson)
not only cost the taxpayers $1 million, but Olson spent $1 million in
attorneys' fees to defend himself.78 Other investigations have necessitated
very high defense costs, ranging from $223,186.66 for a "minor" IC
investigation 79 to $754,449.50 for President Reagan's fees associated with
Iran-Contra. 80
Congress has specifically addressed the problem of exorbitant defense
fees. In the 1994 amendments 8' to the IC statute, Congress imposed
various cost-saving and-controlling measures. These amendments required
"independent counsels to act with due regard for expense; to authorize only
reasonable and lawful expenditures; and to appoint a staff person to track
expenses and function as a 'certifying official' with personal liability for
authorizing improper expenditures."'8 2 The purpose of these cost controls
was "to bring independent counsel expenditures in line with spending by
other federal prosecutors.' 8 3 Of course, given the current cost of the
Whitewater investigation, the efficacy of these provisions is in doubt.
176 Id. at 483.
177 See, e.g., In re North, 94 F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Mullins, 84 F.3d
459 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
178 See Thomas S. Martin, Independent Counsel - Checks and Balances, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536, 538 (1990).
171 In re Mullins, 84 F.3d 459, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The attorneys' fees
resulted from an investigation of President Clinton's passports and private files to
determine if he had renounced his U.S. citizenship for that of dual citizenship with
Great Britain in order to avoid the draft during the Vietnam War. See id. at 461-63.
"
0 See In re North, 94 F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
181 See supra note 2.
182 S. REP. No. 103-10 1, supra note 34, at 24. This quoted portion of legislative
history was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1994).
13 S. REP. No. 103-101, supra note 34, at 24.
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Perhaps the most notable recognition by Congress of the exorbitant
costs involved in IC investigations is found in the 1983 amendments.1 14 The
statute was amended to allow "reimbursement for those reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred by [the defendant] during [the] investigation' 85
when no indictment is returned. The purpose in creating this provision was
to "remedy the rare situation in which a high government official is
unfairly subjected to a more rigorous application of criminal law than other
citizens."'86 Unfortunately, Tucker subjects normal citizens to this "more
rigorous application of criminal law." Given the enormous cost of
defending against an IC investigation as compared to a regular DOJ
investigation, subjecting ordinary citizens to IC investigation or prosecu-
tion is simply unfair. The DOJ can do the job more quickly, for less
taxpayer cost, and for much less cost to the defendant, while still effec-
tively enforcing the law.
4. Accountability
Another often-encountered criticism of the IC statute is that ICs are not
sufficiently accountable. As shown above, 8 7 ICs have virtually limitless
resources upon which to draw in conducting their investigation or
prosecution. Additionally, broad jurisdictional grants, such as that involved
in Tucker,18 8 vest with an IC enormous amounts of discretion as to where,
how, and for how long such resources may be employed.
Given the IC's vast powers and potentially wide-ranging jurisdiction, as
well as the incentives for him to employ both to the fullest, there
obviously exists the potential for abuses of the IC mechanism. For
example, the unlimited budget accorded ICs can be exploited far beyond
the limits of reasonableness.18 9
Ifthe IC mechanism can be abused when applied to public figures covered
by the statute, the possibility of abuse against an ordinary citizen subjected
to an IC probe under Tucker would be particularly great.
4 See supra note 2.
18528 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1994).
I86 S. REP. No. 103-101, supra note 34, at 20.
187 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
188 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
89 O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 493.
1997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The argument that ICs suffer from a lack of accountability in part
ignores the purpose of the IC statute. The special prosecutor provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act were specifically designed to insure that an
IC is not accountable to the Executive branch 9 However, many have
argued, pointing to the virtually meaningless removal provisions of the
statute, that ICs are too independent. 9 ' An IC is subject to removal only by
the Attorney General, 92 and that possibility is virtually the only Executive
Branch control of the IC once he or she is appointed. Originally the statute
allowed removal only for "extraordinary impropriety."'93 However, the
1983 Amendments' 94 altered this requirement to allow for removal "only
for good cause."'' 9 This provision has been criticized as being "somewhat
like referring to shackles as an effective means of locomotion."'19 "While
the Attorney General may be dismissed at will by the President or
impeached by Congress; a regulatory IC can be removed; and line DOJ
prosecutors can be fired, sanctioned, or overruled if they abuse the powers
of their office, the IC, once appointed, is practically untouchable."'' 9
Imagine the consequences of allowing an unaccountable IC to wield
this authority against an ordinary citizen. In discussing this lack of
accountability, one particularly insightful observer has stated:
The potential for abuse of power is exceeded only by the near certainty of
unequal treatment. Even if the IC does not abuse his powers in the sense
of employing them for improper purposes, it is likely that the target of the
investigation will be subjected to scrutiny that is longer, more intensive,
more invasive and more public than that which the average citizen would
suffer.
98
Tucker allows this scrutiny to be brought against an average citizen."9 In
the case of a covered official these concerns are generally outweighed by
'90 See supra notes 4, 30-33 and accompanying text.
191 See generally Jost, supra note 2.
192 See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).
193 Id. § 596(a)(2) (1978).
194 See supra note 2.
128 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1). In addition, the 1994 Amendments, see supra note 2,
allow for removal due to "physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other
condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's
duties." Id.
196 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197 O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 494.
'
98 Id. at 493.
See United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
76 (1996).
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the need for public information and accountability of average citizens to the
general public. However, ifan ordinary citizen is subject to IC prosecution,
it is doubtful that the balance would be the same. Unless that citizen is so
inextricably linked with a covered official as to create a legitimate conflict
of interest, an IC investigation of him would clearly be an unconscionable
burden on his rights and privacy. Thus, the potential for abuse inherent in
any IC investigation, when coupled with an extreme lack of accountability,
renders an IC investigation or prosecution of an ordinary citizen patently
unfair.
5. The Impact of an IC Investigation
An IC investigation that does not result in either an indictment or
formal prosecution can nevertheless be terribly damaging to the investi-
gated party. In addition to the cost and accountability problems discussed
above, IC probes have built-in characteristics that cause them to be
particularly damaging. The IC statute is often criticized as inherently
biased towards prosecution, although impartiality of investigation is more
appropriate.2" indeed, the alteration from "special prosecutor" to
"independent counsel" was meant to "reduce the stigma of, and remove the
Watergate connotation from, a special prosecutor investigation and to more
accurately describe the purpose of appointing an individual to conduct an
investigation."20 1 Clearly Congress recognized "that an independent counsel
is 'subject to formidable public - and perhaps self-imposed - pressure to
indict in the one case he was appointed to pursue."' 202
Aside from the pressure to indict, the reporting requirements of the IC
statute may damage beyond repair the reputation of the subject of the
investigation, particularly if that subject is an ordinary citizen. At the
conclusion of an IC investigation, the IC is required under the statute to
issue a final report "setting forth fully and completely a description of the
work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all cases
brought."2 3 That report is submitted to the Special Division, which then
2"0 See generally O'Sullivan, supra note 34.
201 S. REP. No. 97-406, at 19-20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537,
3555-56.2 2 Martin, supra note 178, at 537 (quoting former Attorney General Edward
Levi, Provision for Special Prosecutor: Hearings on H.R. 14,476, H.R. 11,357,
H.R. 11,999, H.R. 8281, H.R. 8039, H.R. 15,634, and Title I of S. 495 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 35 (1976)).
203 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) (1994).
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has the authority to "release to the Congress, the public, or any appropriate
person, such portions of a report made under this subsection as the division
of court deems appropriate."2' "One anomaly directly arising out of the
report mandate is that an individual against whom criminal charges are not
brought, nonetheless, can be publicly branded a criminal or wrongdoer
.... " 20 5 Even in the absence of this report, "the sound and fury surrounding
the appointment of an IC creates a public sense that there is something to
an allegation - even though the referral itself means nothing of the sort
given the low statutory trigger."
206
These disclosure requirements run counter to longstanding notions of
fundamental fairness in criminal investigatory proceedings. In fact, the
substance of grand jury investigations is specifically deemed to be private,
and any disclosures thereof are explicitly forbidden by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure207 and by DOJ policy.2 The clear intent of such a
prohibition, at least in part, is to avoid any stigma of criminality when the
defendant is in fact innocent. However, Congress imposed mandatory
reporting requirements upon an IC. In the case of an IC investigation
brought to bear against an ordinary citizen under Tucker, the need for
public dissemination is nonexistent. Yet, even in this situation the IC
statute would require the issuance of a final report. Clearly, this require-
ment is just one of the many distinguishing features of ICs and their
investigations that should preclude their use against ordinary citizens.
CONCLUSION
Although the IC statute was based on a long-recognized principle that
became salient during Watergate, the implementation of the statute has
shown that it is fraught with imperfections. The IC statute is very contro-
versial; despite nearly twenty years of implementation, its boundaries and
parameters still are not entirely clear. An additional complexity was
introduced by the Tucker decision, which seemingly allows ICs to
investigate ordinary citizens based on a very broad interpretation ofreferral
jurisdiction. Clearly, such an investigation directly contravenes the intent
and purpose of the IC statute as originally enacted and implemented.
Perhaps even more dangerous than allowing such an investigation, the
204 Id. § 594(h)(2).
205 Martin, supra note 178, at 546-47.
2 O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 501.
207 See FED. R. CraM. P. 6(e).
20 See O'Sullivan, supra note 34, at 484 n.76.
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Tucker court deprived citizens of a right to judicial review when the vast
resources of an IC are brought against him. The result is obvious; the great
authority and power of a statutory IC can easily and irreversibly be brought
against normal citizens. This precedent is especially alarming in light of the
enormous cost of such an investigation, the lack of accountability of an IC,
and the damage to reputation that such an investigation causes. Thus,
Tucker represents an affront to the fair and equitable administration of our
criminal justice system.

